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Abstract
West Bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do
not know wholesale prices. Local middlemen earn large margins; pass-through
from wholesale to farm-gate prices is negligible. When we informed farmers in ran-
domly chosen villages about wholesale prices, average farm-gate sales and prices
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were unaffected, but pass-through to farm-gate prices increased. These results can
be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen,
with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village. They are in-
consistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass-through, search frictions or
risk-sharing contracts. (JEL Codes: O120, L140)
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1 Introduction
It is generally believed that middlemen in agricultural value chains in developing coun-
tries appropriate significant margins.1 However there is little evidence on how large these
margins are, and why they occur. Trading mechanisms between farmers and traders are
also not well understood.2 Do farmers and traders enter into ex ante risk-sharing con-
tracts, or do they bargain only at the time of sale? What are farmers’ outside options?
Do farmers know less about price movements in downstream markets than traders do,
and does this worsen their bargaining position? A better understanding of these issues
may explain the observed low and unresponsive farmgate prices that arguably perpetuate
poverty and limit agricultural growth. It could also explain why the gains from export
growth do not “trickle down” to the ultimate producers, and whether and how increasing
farmers’ access to price information could affect these outcomes.
We examine these questions in the context of the supply chain for potatoes, a high-
value cash crop in the Indian state of West Bengal (WB, hereafter). Farmers in our
study area sell most of their potatoes to village middlemen, who aggregate purchases
and then re-sell them at wholesale markets (mandis) to bulk buyers from distant cities
or neighbouring states. Not only do farmers lack direct access to mandis, they are also
unaware of the prices at which their potatoes are resold there. The gaps between these
resale prices and farmgate prices are large: in the year of our study, farmgate prices were
44-46 percent of wholesale prices. Our calculations suggest that middlemen earned 50-
71% of this gap. The pass-through from retail prices to farmgate prices was a statistically
1Morisset (1998) conjectures that trading companies may have caused large gaps between world com-
modity prices and consumer prices from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Other research argues that mid-
dlemen in cash crop markets prevent the transmission of export price increases to producers (Fafchamps
and Hill 2008, McMillan, Rodrik, and Welch 2002).
2Recent theoretical contributions include Antras and Costinot (2010), Antras and Costinot (2011),
Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Tsumagari (2013) and Chau, Goto, and Kanbur (2009).
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insignificant, negligible 2 percent, while pass-through to wholesale prices was a much
larger 81 percent.3
The lack of direct access to wholesale markets is a distinctive feature of the WB
potato supply chain. In some other Indian states farmers sell directly to wholesale buy-
ers, and middlemen play no role (Goyal 2010, Fafchamps and Minten 2012, Jensen
2007). Increased access to price information in such environments improves spatial ar-
bitrage across markets, reducing price dispersion (Jensen 2007) and increasing average
prices (Goyal 2010).4 In yet other contexts, farmers enter into advance contracts with
middlemen but are also able to sell directly in a spot market; the resulting moral hazard
problem limits the amount of risk-sharing (Blouin and Machiavello 2013, Machiavello
and Morjaria 2015 and Saenger, Torero, and Qaim 2014). However WB potato markets
resemble other vertical structures such as Ugandan coffee (Fafchamps and Hill 2008)
and Mozambican cashews (McMillan, Rodrik, and Welch 2002).
A key goal of our paper is to understand the nature of trading relationships between
middlemen and farmers. Do middlemen enter into ex ante risk-sharing relationships with
farmers (as in Hart 1983, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002, Machiavello 2010)? Could
these account for the low pass-through rates, and can middleman margins be understood
as insurance premiums? Or do middlemen engage in oligopolistic competition, with or
without search frictions, as in most models of pass-through in the trade and IO liter-
ature?5 Our surveys indicate that many farmers engage in repeat transactions with the
same traders. However they rarely report being bound by an advance contractual ar-
3We refer here to price transmission from wholesalers (downstream) to farmers (upstream). The “pass-
through literature” examines transmission of price fluctuations from upstream producers to downstream
consumers. Market structure limits price transmission in both contexts.
4Aker (2010), Nakasone (2013) and Hildebrandt et al. (2015) investigate the effect of mobile phones
on prices in similar market contexts in Niger, Peru and Ghana, respectively.
5See, for example, Mortimer (2008) Antras and Costinot 2010, Bonnet and Dubois (2010), Antras and
Costinot 2011, Chau, Goto, and Kanbur 2009, Atkin and Donaldson 2014, Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010,
Weyl and Fabinger 2013 and Villas-Boas 2007.
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rangement, either explicit or implicit. Instead, most farmers say that they receive daily
price offers from village middlemen and then respond by either selling rightaway, hold-
ing out for a future sale, or transporting their potatoes to a neighboring small market
(called a haat) to sell to a different middleman. This suggests that they engage in spot
bargaining, and that village middlemen and middlemen in haats compete sequentially.
This paper develops a model of such a trading mechanism, and uses a field experi-
ment to discriminate empirically between this model and other competing models. In our
model, village middlemen collude, but compete with middlemen located in the haats.
While bargaining with the village middleman, the farmer’s outside option is to sell to
this haat middleman. The price that the haat middleman offers is higher than the price
that village middleman would offer under monopsony. It also varies with the actual
wholesale price. In this way this outside option generates competitive pressure on the
village middlemen. Price offers from the village middleman inform the farmer about the
price offer they will receive if they hold out and approach the haat middleman instead.
While this bargaining game has many equilibria, we focus on equilibria that generate the
largest profits for the village middleman: these are fully non-revealing (or pooling), so
that the village middleman’s price offer does not vary at all with the wholesale price.6 In
this way the model explains the observed negligible pass-through from wholesale to far-
mgate prices.7 The model also predicts that an intervention informing the farmer about
prevailing wholesale prices would increase the pass-through of wholesale prices to farm-
gate prices. This intervention changes the farmer’s information about his outside option,
and so changes the price that the village middleman offers him. Whether the effect is
6Fully non-revealing equilibria maximize the village middleman’s profits if self-consumption of pota-
toes is relatively unimportant, and if farmers are risk-averse with respect to the price they receive.
7Our model resembles models of relational contracts with private information where pooling can be
more efficient than separating equilibria (Halac 2012, Malcomson 2016). However, in line with our em-
pirical context, players in our trading environment bargain on the spot, instead of entering into implicit ex
ante contracts.
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positive or negative depends on the content of the information: when a treated farmer
learns that his outside option is high, the middleman offers him higher prices. When
instead he learns that it is low, the middleman offers him lower prices. On average, these
heterogeneous effects on farmgate prices tend to cancel out.
To test these predictions, in 2008 we conducted a field experiment in 72 randomly
chosen villages from two potato-growing districts of West Bengal. The villages were
randomly assigned to either one of two treatment groups, or to a control group. In
the treatment groups, we provided farmers with daily information about the prevail-
ing potato prices in neighboring wholesale and retail markets. In one variant, called the
private information treatment, four randomly selected farmers in each of 24 villages re-
ceived the information through phonecalls from our team of telecallers. In the public
information treatment, the information was posted publicly in 24 villages. In the con-
trol villages, no information was provided. Concurrently, we collected high-frequency
data on potato cultivation, harvest, sales and related revenues and costs from a random
sample of potato farmers in each village. Our analysis of the annual average quantity
sold and price received by farmers validates our theoretical predictions: the intervention
increased the pass-through from wholesale to farmgate prices, and that there was no
average effect on farmgate prices and sales.
These results imply that ex ante, the information interventions did not change farm-
ers’ welfare, and reduced traders’ welfare. Ex post, the welfare effects depend on the
actual realizations of wholesale prices.8
Our experimental findings contrast sharply with the predictions of contracting or
8Welfare effects also depend on the effect of the intervention on farmers’ storage decisions. These are
analyzed in Section B in the online Appendix. Empirically, we find that information increased storage only
for a small minority of treated farmers. The observed treatment effects for other farmers were therefore
driven directly by price impacts rather than through induced effects on storage.
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search friction models. Contracts where farmers and middlemen share risk predict that
better information would increase trading volumes when the wholesale price is low,
because improving farmers’ price information reduces screening distortions in low price
states. Also, contrary to models of risk-sharing contracts, WB potato middlemen did not
make net losses ex post at any wholesale price realization. Finally, we do not observe a
decrease in the dispersion of farmgate prices, as would be predicted by models of search
frictions.9
Given our results, it is unlikely that policy interventions that improve farmers’ in-
formation about resale prices would significantly reduce average middleman margins or
enhance welfare. The deeper underlying problem is that middlemen wield considerable
market power, because WB potato farmers lack direct access to wholesale markets. This
lack of market access merits further investigation in future work.
2 The Context: Potato Production and Sales
Potatoes generate the highest value-added per acre of all cash crops produced in West
Bengal (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2011, Maitra et al. 2017). The crop is planted between
October and December, and harvested between January and March. The farmer might
sell part of his output immediately, place some in home stores to be sold at any time in
the next two or three months, and place the rest in cold stores, to be sold at any time
until the cold stores are emptied in November.10
9The key analytical difference between our model and standard models of search frictions is that early
price offers affect the farmer’s beliefs about the distribution of offers that might follow if he continues to
search. However, our model shares with standard search models the prediction that the gap between prices
offered by traders within and outside the village would narrow. We do see this in the data.
10Due to cold store technical constraints and government regulations, potatoes cannot be carried over
from one year to the next. Own-consumption accounts for less than 5% of the harvest.
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2.1 Farmer-Trader Transactions and Market Structure
Farmers sell more than 90% of their marketed potatoes to traders operating within the
same village (see Table 1).11 The average village has about 10 such middlemen. They
make price offers to local farmers on a daily basis. Farmers who choose not to sell
to them, can instead sell to traders at local markets (haats) located an average of 5
km from the village. Traders check the quantity and quality of potatoes that they buy,
transport them to wholesale markets (mandis) located 8 km away on average, where they
negotiate sales to traders from city markets or neighboring states.12 Most potatoes are
sold ultimately to consumers in retail markets in Kolkata or neighboring states.
In a 2007 survey, farmers reported selling 72% of their potatoes to buyers whom
they had been selling to for a year or more, and 32% to buyers whom they had been
selling to for two years or more. However this high incidence of repeat transactions does
not necessarily imply that they have prior contractual arrangements. In fact, our surveys
indicate contracts are not common. In 2007, farmers sold only 21% of their potatoes to
buyers from whom they had an outstanding loan. Farmers also told us that they were
not bound to sell to the trader who had provided them inputs or credit, but were free to
sell to someone else and to use the proceeds to repay the loan. In surveys we conducted
in 2012, only 33% of the 144 randomly selected middlemen who purchased potatoes in
our study villages reported a prior agreement to buy from their oldest supplier that year.
A mere 6% reported an explicit arrangement about the quantity that they would buy, and
16% reported either an explicit or implicit understanding about the price they would pay.
11We restrict our analysis to the jyoti and chandramukhi varieties. Together these made up 90 percent
of the potatoes grown by sample farmers.
12Village middlemen also trade in other seasonal produce and often sell agricultural inputs and provide
credit; many of them have a shop in the village. Thus farmers and traders interact face-to-face at a high
frequency, so that search costs are negligible.
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Trader survey results are consistent with the hypothesis of collusion among village
middlemen: 43 to 51% of traders admitted that they exchanged information about recent
price offers with other traders before making offers to farmers, and about 40% said they
checked recent sale prices with farmers. However they are less likely to collude with
traders operating at the local haat, since they meet them less frequently and are unable
to monitor their transactions.
The evidence also indicates that farmers lack access to wholesale buyers. Direct sales
at the wholesale market are extremely rare: they account for less than 2% of sales (Table
1). In informal interviews, wholesale buyers told us that it was “not worth their while”
to negotiate small trades and to monitor the quantity and quality of potatoes from many
different farmers whom they did not know personally.
Ultimately, the market power of middlemen rests on barriers to entry into their line of
business. In our 2012 survey, traders told us that capital was the important requirement
to enter the potato trade. The median capital requirement reported was |50,000 (mean
= |94472).13 They also said it was important to have had a prior apprenticeship with a
trader for an average of 3.5 years, and 3 years of experience cultivating potatoes. Prior
contacts with at least 25 farmers, and large buyers in at least 3 distant markets were other
important requirements. This suggests that entry requires financial investments as well
as investments in relationships, which take time to build.
In addition, the regulatory environment in West Bengal restricts entry into the potato
trading business. The West Bengal Agricultural Marketing Committee (APMC) Act re-
quires any large firm seeking to buy directly from farmers to obtain a license from the
state government. Cohen (2013) documents the fact that the West Bengal government
13The average agricultural loan for planting potatoes in these villages is about |8000 (data collected
through informal interviews). Thus |50,000 is a forbiddingly large amount of capital for the average
farmer in this village to raise.
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rarely provides such licenses. No agri-retail firms were purchasing potatoes in our sam-
ple villages at the time we conducted our study. Thus the only competition that village
traders face is from traders located in the neighbouring haat.
2.2 Farmers’ Price Information
Transactions between the traders and buyers from distant markets are often bilateral.
Therefore, information about the price that the trader receives is not in the public do-
main. In our 2007 baseline farmer surveys, 46% said their only source of wholesale
price information was the trader they sold to. Only 13% reported asking friends and
neighbours, and 6% received information through the media (See Appendix Table A2).14
Although public telephone booths, landline phones and mobile phones were all available
to varying extents, farmers told us that they had no contacts at mandis who would tell
them the prevailing mandi price.
Responses to our farmer surveys suggest there is substantial information asymme-
try between farmers and traders. Every fortnight from February to November 2008, we
asked farmers to tell us the recent price in their neighboring market. Their reports (av-
erage |2.57 per kg) were very different from the village traders’ resale prices that week
(average |4.82 per kg). Instead, they were quite similar to the prices that farmers re-
ceived if they sold at a haat in that week (average |2.55 per kg).15 In other words, they
(mis-)interpreted the term “market price” to mean the price they would receive if they
took their potatoes to the haat, not the price at which middlemen resold their produce
at the mandi. The mean absolute deviation between wholesale prices reported by farm-
14The media tends not to cover this layer in the supply chain: only three of the mandis in our sample
exist in the official database on wholesale prices.
15The gross price at which a farmer sold at a market is computed by dividing the total revenue he
received from selling at a market across all weeks in the year, by the quantity sold. |2.55 is the average of
this number across all farmers who sold at haats.
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ers and actual wholesale prices was 42.5% of the mean actual price. In Section 3.2 we
present evidence that our information intervention significantly reduced this error.
2.3 Price Transmission Patterns
To what extent do fluctuations in retail prices pass through to traders and farmers? The
first column in Table 2 presents the result of a regression of weekly mandi prices from
2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012 (only from weeks 13 and beyond for years other than 2008),
on the weekly retail price in the relevant destination city market (Kolkata for mandis
in Hugli districts, and Bhubaneswar for mandis in West Medinipur district). After con-
trolling for mandi-specific annual potato yields, and year, mandi and week fixed effects,
the pass-through from city prices to the mandi prices is considerable: a |1 increase in
the city price is associated with a |0.81 increase in the mandi price. We confirm that
the pass-through is large and significant even in 2008, the year of our study (column
2). However, as column 3 of the table shows, in 2008, when city prices increased by
|1, the change in farmgate prices was a statistically non-significant |0.02. Column 4
shows that the pass-through from mandi prices to farmgate prices is also small (0.04)
and non-significant.
This low price transmission is accompanied by large middleman margins, as we
discuss below.
2.4 Margins Earned by Middlemen
Middlemen often hold potatoes after purchase, with a view to selling them later in the
year when they expect the price to be high. However since they have the option of re-
selling them immediately upon purchase, the difference between their selling and buying
9
prices at the same point of time provides a lower bound to their expected gross margin.16
Since we do not have data on traders’ actual selling costs in 2008, we use as estimates
the unit cost data for transport, handling and storage reported by farmers. Traders might
exploit economies of scale and connections with store owners to reduce their unit costs
below these numbers; if so, using farmer reports for unit costs gives us a lower bound to
trader net margins.
Trader cost overheads vary by season, and we calculated average margins separately
for each.17 Using the distribution of quantities sold in the sample in different weeks as
weights, we estimate average prices at which traders resold potatoes in the harvest and
post-harvest seasons. We subtract the average price that farmers received when they sold
to village traders, to arrive at the traders’ gross margins.18 Our calculations can be seen
in Table A1 in the Appendix. After subtracting the relevant unit costs, the lower bounds
on mean net trader margins in 2008 are |1.85 per kg at harvest time, and |1.36 per kg
after harvest time. Middlemen therefore earned at least 28 to 38 percent of the mandi
price, and 64 to 83 percent of the farmgate price, depending on the season when they
bought and sold the crop.19
16We do not adjust for traders’ interest costs, since these are not relevant when potatoes are resold at
the same time as they are purchased.
17Traders would not incur storage costs for transactions in the harvest period: they would buy potatoes
from the field, have them cleaned and sorted and then transport them to the mandi and load them directly
onto trucks sent by buyers. After June, traders buy potato bonds from farmers, pay storage charges to
release the potatoes from the cold store, and have them dried, sorted, colored and loaded into the buyers’
trucks. They do not incur transport costs at this stage because most cold storage facilities are located close
to mandis.
18Cold stores charge a flat rate regardless of how long the potatoes are stored. We are careful to adjust
traders’ per-kg cost of transport according to the average distance that they transport potatoes.
19These numbers are similar to those found in previous work: In his 1998-99 study of 136 potato farmers
in the Arambagh block of Hugli district, Basu (2008) found that middlemen margins net of transactions
costs were 25 percent of retail price in the busy season, and 20 percent in the lean season. Farmgate prices
were between 49 and 36 percent of the retail price.
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3 The Experiment and the Data
Our experiment was conducted in a stratified random sample of 72 villages from the
potato growing blocks of Hugli and West Medinipur districts. To reduce information
spillovers, we ensured that sample villages were at least 10 kilometres apart from each
other. In each block, sample villages were randomly assigned to three groups.20 In two
groups of 24 villages each, we conducted two different information treatments, while in
the third group, we provided no information. In the two treatment groups, we delivered
daily information about the price in the mandis that were relevant to the village. This
was the price at which traders had re-sold potatoes to large buyers at these mandis, the
previous day. In our analysis below we refer to this as the mandi price.21 In addition, we
also delivered information about the previous day’s price at the nearest city market.
In the 24 private information villages, the price information was delivered individ-
ually to 4 households selected randomly from our survey households. Every morning
for 11 months, the “tele-callers” based in our Kolkata information center relayed the
mandi prices to each of these farmers via mobile phones that were given to them for
the purpose of the project. The phones were merely a device by which to deliver the
information. To ensure that they did not improve the farmers’ connectivity more gener-
ally, we worked with the service provider to block outgoing calls from the phones, and
changed the phone settings so that farmers could not view their own number. We did not
inform the farmers of their mobile phone numbers, and all phone bills were delivered
to us. This prevented the farmer from receiving any incoming calls except from us. We
20Each village was then mapped to the mandi(s) that were closest to it, which is where potatoes grown
in that village tended to be re-sold by traders. Since blocks have one or two mandis, this effectively ensures
that sample villages under a given mandi are randomly assigned to different information treatments.
21The total volume of potatoes sold by our sample farmers in 2008 was less than 1 percent of the total
volume traded in the large mandis in this area, so it is unlikely that our interventions changed mandi
prices.
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verified that our restrictions were effective. Our telecaller records indicate that 62% of
all calls to private information recipients were received, and in 92% of the villages at
least one cell phone recipient answered the call.
In the 24 public information villages, we delivered the mandi price information to
a local shopkeeper or phone-booth owner (called the “vendor”) in the village. For a
nominal fee, he wrote the price information on charts and posted them in three public
places in the village.22 Through random checks we were able to verify that the price
information was posted regularly.
The information interventions were piloted in the sample villages during June-
November 2007. The actual experiment began in January 2008 and continued daily until
November 2008. All villages and households were in the same treatment or control
group in 2008 as they were in 2007. All empirical estimates of the interventions on
farmer quantities and revenues will be presented for the 2008 data.
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We conducted surveys with a stratified random sample of 24 potato-growing households
in each of the 72 villages in our study.23 We restrict the analysis to the 1545 sample farm-
ers who planted either of the two main varieties (jyoti and chandramukhi) of potatoes in
2008. A production survey was conducted in February, followed by a trade survey each
fortnight between February and November. Table A2 in the Appendix shows a number
of village and households characteristics by treatment groups, based on data collected
before the pilot information interventions began in June 2007. Across all household
22If asked, telecallers and vendors were instructed to say that the information was being delivered for a
research study, but they did not know its purpose, or how the information could be used.
23In 2006 we conducted a census in all sample villages to record which households had planted potatoes
that year. We then stratified all potato-growing households by landholding category and drew a random
sample from each stratum.
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characteristics, the pre-intervention differences across treatment groups were jointly in-
significant.
3.2 Effect of Information on Farmers’ Price Information
In the fortnightly trade surveys, we asked farmers how frequently they tracked prices
in wholesale and retail potato markets, and whom they collected the price information
from. To analyse whether the interventions changed farmers’ price tracking behavior,
we run a regression according to the specification
yivt = β0 + β1Private Informationv + β2Phone Recipientiv + β3Public Informationv
+β4Xivt + ivt
where yivt measures whether farmer i in village v tracked wholesale prices in fortnight t
(Table 3, Panel A, Column 1), the number of days since he last tracked prices (Column
2), and his source of information (Column 3). Accordingly, we use a logit specification
in Column 1, and a Poisson regression in Column 2.24 Private information and Public in-
formation are dummy variables indicating the treatment group that the farmer’s village
is assigned to. In the villages that received the private information treatment, the four
randomly chosen households who received information directly via mobile phone re-
ceived a value of 1 for the Phone recipient dummy, as well as a value of 1 for the Private
Information dummy. Hence the coefficient on Private information should be interpreted
24To avoid “demand effects” caused by survey questions that made our intervention salient, when we
asked farmers to report their information source, we did not offer a choice indicating our intervention. The
choices provided were, in order: friends, relatives, neighbours, caste members, traders, local government
officials, NGO employees, cooperative members and other. If farmers chose the category “other” over all
the previous categories, we interpret this as the information intervention. We re-code the variable to an
indicator for whether the information was received through the intervention. Also, questions about price
information were asked only to a randomly selected one-half of the sample. The results in Tables 6 and
7 continue to hold even if we analyze only the subset of households that were not asked questions about
their price-tracking behaviour. See Appendix Table A4.
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as the effect on farmers whose village received the private information treatment, but
who did not personally receive phonecalls. Their outcomes would presumably be af-
fected through the spread of information within the village. Control variables include
the household’s landholding, indicator variables for the potato variety, district, and the
survey month. For convenience we report exponentiated coefficients in all three columns.
The results indicate that the intervention worked as planned. Farmers who received
the interventions were significantly more likely to say that they track market prices and
to have tracked them recently (columns 1 and 2). They were also more likely to report
that they received the information through the intervention (column 3). The magnitude of
the effects were larger in the public information treatment than in the private information
treatment, and within the private information treatment, were larger for phone recipients.
Panel B in Table 3 shows that the intervention improved the precision with which
farmers tracked prices. When we match the prices that farmers reported with the actual
prices in the markets that they tracked, the average sum of squares of the normalized
error in reported price is 0.18-0.19 for intervention households, which is significantly
lower than the 0.22 for control households. This represents a decrease of 13.9 percent in
the mean absolute deviation from the true price.25
4 Theory: Bargaining with Asymmetric Information
Consider a game with a single farmer F with an exogenous stock of potatoes Q, a single
village trader V T ,26 and a set of market traders located in a haat outside the village.
25Recall from Section 2.2 that farmers appear to have interpreted the words “market price” as the price
they could expect to receive if they sold at the haat, rather than the price at which traders resold their
potatoes in the mandi. The information we delivered was about these resale prices. The reader may then
wonder why the interventions reduced the error in their reports. It is likely that the information helped
farmers infer the price they could get if they sold in the haat.
26This corresponds to the assumption that village traders collude perfectly with one another.
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F cannot sell potatoes directly at the mandi located outside the village. He can sell
either to the V T , or to a market trader. Every trader can resell the potatoes at the mandi
at the prevailing price w, which they observe, and take as given. The farmer does not
observe w, but he believes it follows a prior distribution G on support [w, w¯] where
∞ > w¯ > w ≥ 0.
Following a realization of w, the sequence of moves is as follows. At stage 1, V T
meets F , and makes him a price offer p1. F decides whether and how much (q1) to sell
at this price. At stage 2, the farmer decides whether to incur a transport cost of s to visit
the haat with a quantity q2 ≤ Q − q1 to sell to a market trader. He expects to receive
at the haat a price h(w), which is strictly increasing in w and satisfies h(w) < w for
all w. The price h(w) is determined through oligopolistic competition between market
traders.27
Let the total quantity the farmer sells be denoted by q ≡ q1 + q2 ∈ [0, Q]; the
remainder Q− q is consumed. His net sales revenue is R ≡ p1q1 + I[h(w)q2− s], where
I ∈ {0, 1} denotes the decision to visit the haat. His payoff is W (R + βU(Q − q))
where W is a strictly increasing, smooth concave function satisfying W ′′ ≤ 0, and U is
a strictly increasing, smooth and strictly concave function satisfying U ′(0) = ∞. The
parameter β ≥ 0 represents the importance of self-consumption in the farmer’s payoff
function. Our data show that farmers consume no more than 5% of their harvest, so we
shall focus on the case where β is small. We assume throughout that w > βU ′(Q), so
there are always gains from trade. In the limiting case where β = 0, the farmer either
sells his entire harvest or nothing at all, and the problem reduces to selling an indivisible
good.
27A specific example is one with k equidistant market traders on a concentric circle of unit length,
as in Salop (1979). With linear transport cost t per unit distance traversed by farmers, simultaneous price
competition between the market traders yields price h(w) which solves the equationw−h = [ q′(h)q(h) + kt ]−1.
Here kt is a parameter representing the extent of competition in the haat.
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We now introduce a number of assumptions. Let q(p) denote the farmer’s supply
function, which maximizes pq+βU(Q− q), and define Π(p) ≡ pq(p) +βU(Q− q(p)).
Clearly q(p) is strictly positive at any price p satisfying p > βU ′(Q), strictly increasing
and approaches Q as p becomes arbitrarily large. Our first assumption is that the supply
function is weakly concave (q′′(.) ≤ 0).28
The second assumption is that W (Π(p)) is concave. That is, an increase in farmgate
price risk makes F worse off. In the limiting case where β is zero, this requires W to
be weakly concave, and includes the case where the farmer is risk-neutral. Hence we
assume at least a mild level of risk-aversion, with the required lower bound vanishing as
β approaches zero.29
Our final assumption pertains to the nature of competitive pressure imposed by the
market traders on V T . If there were no competition from other traders, V T would be-
have monopsonistically, and select monopsony price m(w) = arg max(w − m)q(m)
which solves w = m + q(m)
q′(m) . We assume that if F were to know the realization of
w, V T would have to offer him more than the monopsony price, to prevent F from
exercising his option to visit the haat. Specifically, for all w ∈ [w, w¯]
M(w) > m(w) (1)
where F ’s reservation price M(w) is defined by
Π(M(w)) = Π(h(w))− s (2)
28This allows the constant elasticity consumption utility function U(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ when σ > 0 and
different from 1, where supply function is q(p) = Q − p− 1σ . If σ = 1 the utility function is logarithmic
and q(p) = 0.
29If W (y) = y
1−µ
1−µ and U(c) =
c1−σ
1−σ with µ, σ ≥ 0, 6= 1, we need µ > 1σ
(
β
p
) 1
σ [Q + σ1−σ
(
β
p
) 1
σ ][Q −(
β
p
) 1
σ ]−2, where p denotes a lower bound to the price that V T could offer. Such a natural lower bound
does turn out to exist: the farmer’s reservation price in state w.
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We also assume that Π(h(w)) > s, to ensure that M(.) is well-defined and positive-
valued.
We use Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE) as the equilibrium concept.
Suppose V ≡ W (Π(.)). Then, formally, the equilibrium is a price-offer by V T and an
acceptance strategy for F p(w), a(p), with supporting posterior beliefs G(.|p) that obey
Bayes rule on the equilibrium path, where:
1. p(w) maximizes a(p)[w − p]q(p)
2. a(p) maximizes aV (p) + (1− a)EG(.|p)[V (M(w))] over [0, 1]
The outcome of any WPBE is a pattern of state-dependent trades, where in state w,
F sells:
F sells

q(p(w)) to V T with probability α(w) ≡ a(p(w))
q(h(w)) to F otherwise
4.1 Classes of Equilibria
We first describe different classes of equilibria, which vary in terms of how much in-
formation V T ’s price offers convey to F about the realization of w. We first describe
equilibria that reveal w entirely, then those that convey no information at all, and fi-
nally hybrid forms that convey some information. We then present the main results and
explain the intuition behind them. Formal proofs can be found in the online Appendix.
4.2 Fully Revealing Equilibrium
An equilibrium is said to be fully revealing or separating if the associated price offer
function p(.) is strictly increasing in w.
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Proposition 1 When (1) holds, there exists a fully revealing or separating equilibrium,
where V T offers p(w) = M(w) in state w, and the offer is accepted by F with prob-
ability α(w) ∈ [0, 1] which is a strictly increasing function satisfying the differential
equation
α′(w)
α(w)
=
M ′(w)
w −M(w) [1−
(w −M(w))q′(M(w))
q(M(w))
] (3)
with endpoint constraint α(w¯) ≤ 1.30
Along the equilibrium path, F can infer the exact realization of w from the observed
price offer. The price offer equals F ’s reservation price corresponding to state w, so that
F is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. F accepts with probability α(w),
which by construction creates an incentive for V T to offer the price M(w) when the
state is w. Since M(w) > m(w) and V T ’s payoff function is concave in the price, he is
tempted to offer a price lower than M(w). However the price offer reveals w to F , and,
and given F ’s outside option of selling at M(w), a lower price offer is less likely to be
accepted. This offsets the larger profit that V T obtains if it is accepted. The possibility
that trade does not occur is a deadweight loss arising from V T ’s incentive compatibility
constraint: V T is worse off when the price offer is not accepted, while F is indifferent.
4.3 Fully Non-Revealing Equilibrium
At the other extreme, if V T offers the same price p¯ irrespective of the realization of w
and F accepts the offer with some positive probability α¯, then the equilibrium reveals
no information to F . When such a fully non-revealing equilibrium (FNRE) exists, and
α¯ ∈ (0, 1), F must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Any such equilibrium
is Pareto dominated by an equilibrium where the pooled price p¯ is identical, but F instead
30The equilibrium is supported by off-equilibrium path beliefs wherein any price offer below p(w) leads
F to believe w = w with probability one, and any price offer above p(w¯) leads him to believe w = w¯
with probability one.
18
accepts with probability one. For this reason we focus on FNRE with α¯ = 1.31
Proposition 2 The following conditions are sufficient and (almost) necessary for the
existence of a fully non-revealing equilibrium, where V T offers the same price p¯ irre-
spective of the realization of w, and this price offer is accepted by F with probability
one:32
(FP1) w ≥ p¯, where p¯ satisfies W (Π(p¯)) = Ew[W (Π(M(w)))].
(FP2) If the state is w¯, V T does not deviate from price offer p¯ to price offer M(w¯),
where M(w¯) is also accepted with probability one.
Note that while the the fully revealing equilibrium always exists, the fully non-
revealing equilibria can fail to exist if the support of the distribution of w is sufficiently
wide.33 However, when this happens, partially revealing equilibria generally exist. We
describe these next.
4.4 Partially Revealing Equilibrium
In a step-function partially revealing equilibrium (SPRE) the price offer is a step
function. The support of w is partitioned into a set of consecutive intervals Ii ≡
31There may also exist FNRE involving a pooled price above p¯ where F is strictly better off accepting
than rejecting, and where the price offer is accepted with probability one. Such an FNRE cannot be
compared in the Pareto sense with the one we focus on below, because it makes F better off but makes
V T worse off. In what follows we ignore such FNRE by assuming that the equilibrium that maximizes
V T ’s payoff is selected.
32It is supported by the following off-equilibrium-path beliefs: if the price offer is p ≤ p¯, then F does
not update his beliefs. If p ≥ p¯, F believes w = w¯.
33One example is when w is 0 or sufficiently close to 0: the fixed price in a pooling equilibrium has to
be positive, and so has to be larger than w; this cannot happen when w = 0. When w is sufficiently low,
V T is unwilling to pay F more than w. Alternately, if the upper bound w¯ of the support of the wholesale
price is sufficiently large but the pooling price is bounded, then condition (FP2) is violated: the fixed price
is too far below M(w¯), and V T offers a price above p¯.
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[wi, wi+1], i = 1, . . . , n with w1 = w and wn+1 = w¯. V T offers a constant price p¯i
when w is in [wi, wi+1), with p¯i > p¯i−1. On the equilibrium path, F accepts offer p¯i with
probability αi. The fixed price p¯i satisfies W (Π(p¯i)) = Ew|w∈Ii][W (Π(M(w)))], and F
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting p¯i after learning that w ∈ [wi, wi+1].
Proposition 3 The following conditions are sufficient and (almost) necessary for a step-
function partially revealing equilibrium to exist.34 For each i:
(PP1) wi ≥ p¯i.
(PP2) If the state is wi+1, V T is indifferent between offering p¯i and p¯i−1.
(PP3) If the state is w¯, V T does not deviate from price offer p¯n to price offer M(w¯),
where M(w¯) is accepted with probability one.
A partially revealing equilibrium is intermediate between a fully non-revealing and
fully revealing equilibrium. V T ’s price offer varies in a coarse way with w: rising when
w moves from one interval to the next, but constant within any interval. As in a sep-
arating equilibrium, all price offers except the highest have to be rejected with some
probability, and acceptance probabilities must rise with the price offer. In any interval
Ii = [wi, wi+1], when w is close to wi, V T is tempted to lower the price offer from p¯i
to p¯i−1, since p¯i > M(wi) > m(wi). However the penalty for lowering the price is that
the lower price will be rejected with a higher probability. Within any given interval Ii,
the price offer is constant, and trade takes place with some probability. The ratio of the
probabilities that F accepts p¯i and p¯i−1 is selected to ensure that condition (PP2) holds.
This is analogous to (3) in a fully revealing equilibrium.
34When he receives an offer in the interval Ii = (p¯i−1, p¯i], F updates the support of his beliefs to Ii.
Offers below p¯1 induce the same beliefs as p¯1, while any offer above p¯n induces F to believe that w = w¯.
F rejects any offer in the interval (p¯i−1, p¯i).
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There can also be equilibria which are partially revealing in other ways: price offer
functions that are mixtures of step-functions and strictly increasing segments. Clearly
there is a plethora of possible equilibria, varying in the extent of information that is
revealed to F .
Since F is always indifferent between accepting and rejecting the price offers in each
equilibrium, it is evident that the separating, fully non-revealing and partially revealing
equilibria all generate the same ex ante welfare for F . However V T ’s ex ante welfare
could vary. We turn to this issue next.
4.5 Comparing Profitability of Alternative Equilibria
We start by comparing the ex ante profits earned by V T in the selected FRE and FNRE,
assuming the FNRE exists.
Proposition 4 If β is sufficiently small, V T earns a larger ex ante profit in the FNRE
than in any FRE.
The key force driving the result is that trade may not occur at all in the FRE, whereas
the FNRE always results in trade. Besides, the sale price in the FRE varies with the state,
resulting in risk that benefits neither V T nor F . Since F has the same expected utility
in both equilibria, the constant price in the FNRE is lower than the average price in
the FRE. This lower average price in the FNRE also benefits V T , since the farmer’s
reservation price is higher than the monopsony price. From V T ’s point of view, the
FRE outperforms the FNRE only in one dimension: the quantity he purchases co-moves
with the wholesale price, so that he purchases larger (resp. smaller) quantities when the
wholesale price is high (resp. low). This benefit is small when F places a low value on
personal consumption. At the same time the deadweight loss associated with failure to
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trade in most states remains bounded away from zero, so the FNRE results in a larger
expected profit for V T when β is small enough.
Our final result below considers the limiting case where β = 0, and shows that the
FNRE is the most profitable equilibrium across all equilibria. If the FNRE does not exist,
a similar result obtains for the comparison of step-function partially revealing equilibria
with more or less information revealed to the farmer (in the sense of Blackwell). Hence
profit-maximizing equilibria involve maximal pooling.
Proposition 5 Suppose β = 0, and an FNRE exists. Then the FNRE where a constant
price offer p¯ is accepted with probability one, generates the largest ex ante profit of all
WPBE equilibria.
4.6 Effects of Information Provision
Now consider how these equilibria are affected by an information intervention, which
changes F ’s prior beliefs. There will be no effect at all if the equilibrium is fully reveal-
ing. Non-revealing equilibria will be affected. Given the results in the previous section,
we assume that the fully non-revealing equilibrium exists and is the prevailing equilib-
rium selected by traders both before and after the intervention.35
It is easiest to consider the case where the information provided by the intervention
is represented by a partition of the set of possible wholesale prices, i.e., farmers receive
a price signal σ(w) which takes the form of a step function, taking the value σj when
w ∈ Ij ≡ [wj, wj+1], with j = 1, . . . ,m, σj+1 > σj and w1 = w,wm = w¯. The signal
35The results are qualitatively similar when the fully non-revealing equilibrium fails to exist, so that
the pre-intervention “maximal pooling equilibrium” is partially revealing. In such an equilibrium V T ’s
price offer p¯i informs F that w belongs to interval Ii. As long as the intervention generates a different
information partition than Ii, it affects the equilibrium allocation. The price offers in the new equilibrium
then co-move more with the wholesale price.
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alters F ’s beliefs: signal realization σj informs F that w ∈ Ij . A fully non-revealing
equilibrium conditional on this new set of beliefs now involves a different pooled price
p¯j satisfying [W (Π(p¯j)) = Ew|w∈Ij ][W (Π(M(w)))]. If j is low (resp. high), F learns
that the wholesale price is low (resp. high), so that the pooled price is lower (resp. higher)
than if F did not receive the signal. The price that F receives now co-moves more with
the wholesale price. We therefore expect to see a significant drop in price and traded
quantity when the wholesale price is low, and a significant rise in price and traded
quantity when the wholesale price is high. The effects on the average price and quantity
may thus be negligible.36
Similar predictions obtain when the price signal does not alter the support of the
farmer’s beliefs, if it satisfies a monotone likelihood property such that low values of w
are correlated with low values of the signal. Given a signal σ which induces the farmer’s
beliefs over w to be updated toG(.|σ), the intervention results in a pooled price p¯(σ) sat-
isfying W (Π(p¯(σ))) = E{G(w|σ)}[W (Π(M(w)))]. If σ and w are positively correlated,
high (resp. low) realizations of w and σ tend to occur together with high probability,
causing p¯ to co-move with w. Compared to before the intervention, the farmgate price
and sold quantity now co-move more with the wholesale price, and are lower (resp.
higher) when the wholesale price is lower (resp. higher) than average.
These predictions are summarized in the first row of Table 4, and turn out to be
different from predictions of other competing models of the trading mechanism that we
describe in Section 6.
However the model predicts that information provision leaves the farmer’s
ex ante welfare unaffected. Conditional on signal σj , the farmer’s welfare is
36However, because W (Π(.)) is concave, the effects are not necessarily zero. If W (Π(.)) were strictly
concave, the effect on the average price is positive.
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Ew|w∈Ij ][W (Π(M(w)))], so the unconditional ex ante welfare isE[W (Π(M(w)))]. This
is a general property of all equilibria, both before and after the provision of information.
The arguments above indicate that the effect on village trader’s welfare is negative if β
is sufficiently small. Hence information provision results in an ex ante Pareto inferior
outcome!
5 Experimental Results
We now turn to empirical tests of the theoretical predictions above. We abstract from dy-
namic considerations associated with effects on storage and timing of sales by farmers.
Accordingly, we simplify the empirical analysis by aggregating the data to the annual
level. The empirical results are not substantially modified when we extend the model to
incorporate dynamic aspects (see Section B in the Appendix).
5.1 Average Treatment Effects
We start by estimating the effect of the interventions on the farmers’ sales and revenues.
Our data include information about the quantity of potatoes of each variety and self-
reported quality grade that a given farmer sold in each transaction in 2008, and the gross
revenue and the net (of transport, handling and storage costs) revenue and price per
kilogram he received. We aggregate the sales of each variety-quality combination by
farmer across the year, to compute the annual quantity sold and the annual average of
farmgate price.
Table 5 shows the average treatment impacts. The regression specification follows
equation (1), where yikqv is the dependent variable: annual quantity of variety k and
quality q sold by farmer i in village v, and net farmgate price, which is the ratio of the
24
annual net revenue received to the quantity sold.37 Besides controlling for the farmer’s
landholding size, all regressions include dummies for the potato variety and quality.
In alternative columns, we include mandi fixed effects to control for fixed differences
at the mandi level.38 In column (1) the sign of the coefficient for all three intervention
dummies is positive, but none of them are significantly different from zero. Including
mandi fixed effects in column (2) reverses the sign of the private information and the
public information coefficients, and they all remain insignificant, consistent with our
theoretical predictions.39 Columns (3) and (4) show that there is also no significant av-
erage impact of the intervention on farmgate prices. In Figure 1 we plot average weekly
farmgate prices in the treatment and the control villages, and the corresponding mandi
prices. In line with our regression results, there is no discernible difference between the
different farmgate price series.
5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The main prediction of the ex post bargaining model in Section 4 is that informing farm-
ers about the mandi price would increase the quantity they sold and price they received
if the mandi price was high, and lower it if the mandi price was low. To verify this
prediction rigorously we use the regression specification:
yikqv = β0 + β1νikm + β2Private informationv + β3Phone recipientiv + β4Public informationv
+β5(Private informationv × νikm) + β6(Phone recipientiv × νikm)
+β7(Public informationv × νikm) + β8Xikqv + ikqv
37We discount the revenue for delays between the time of sale and the date when payment is received.
38Sample villages were mapped to the mandi whose catchment area they lay in. In the information
interventions, farmers/village vendors received the price information from that mandi.
39Since the estimated effects on quantity and farmgate prices with mandi fixed effects are negative for
the private information treatment farmers who don’t receive phonecalls, we think it unlikely that the true
effects are positive but simply not detected due to lack of statistical power.
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where νikm is the realized average price (or price shock) in mandim. As before, standard
errors are clustered at the village level.
For these heterogeneous effects to be identified, it must be the case that the mandi
price is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression. In particular, it is important
that variation in mandi prices not be correlated with variation in unobserved character-
istics that might also affect the pass-through of prices. Note first that our experiment
involved only a small fraction of the villages supplying to each market, so wholesale
mandi prices were unlikely to be affected by our treatments.40 As Table A3 in the Ap-
pendix shows, within any district, mandis with average annual prices above and below
the median were not significantly different in distance from the retail market, access to
metalled roads, agricultural wage rates, or presence of industry/manufacturing. There is
some evidence (only in Hugli district) that the average yield was slightly higher in vil-
lages under mandis with the above-median annual average price, and that the residents of
these villages were less likely to have landline phones. However, the mandi fixed effects
in our regressions control for these differences.41 Below we also discuss a robustness
check where we instrument for the mandi price with the city price.
The results in Tables 6 and 7 correspond to quantity sold and price per kilogram,
respectively. The different columns in Table 6 use different specifications of the mandi
price, different samples and different dependent variables. Focus first on Columns 1
through 4, where all 1545 farmers are included in the sample, and the total quantity of
potatoes sold (in kilograms) is regressed on the intervention dummies and their interac-
tions with the price regressor. In column 1 the price regressor is the mandi price for each
farmer-variety combination in the sample, averaged over the weeks when the farmer sold
40Recall that the block-stratified assignment of villages to treatment category ensures that under a given
mandi there are villages randomly assigned to different information treatments.
41Results are qualitatively similar when mandi fixed effects are not included.
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the variety. Thus it represents the average resale price the trader could have received for
potatoes he purchased from this farmer, and we estimate how farmer outcomes vary with
this price.
We see a positive coefficient on the mandi price average, although it is not signif-
icant.42 The intercept effects on both the private and public information treatments are
negative, and the interactions of the treatment with the average mandi price are positive.
In other words, the information interventions caused farmers facing a low mandi price to
sell a smaller quantity than they would have sold otherwise. However, at higher mandi
prices, this negative effect was attenuated. The results indicate that in a village facing
the 10th percentile of mandi price, the private information intervention caused a (phone
non-recipient) farmer to reduce sales by 1090 kg (or 28 percent of the control mean,
significant at 10%), and the public information intervention caused the farmer to reduce
sales by 1189 kg (or 31 percent, significant at 5%). In a village facing the 90th percentile
of mandi price, the private and public information caused farmers to sell an additional
1158 kg (or 30 percent) and 723 kg (or 19 percent) respectively, although these two pos-
itive effects are not statistically significant. From column 1 in Table 7 we calculate that
in a village facing the 10th percentile of mandi price, the private information interven-
tion lowered the farmgate price received by a phone non-recipient farmer by 18 paise
(or 9%), whereas in a village facing the 90th percentile of the mandi price, it increased
his farmgate price by 24 paise (or 12%).
The weights used to compute the farmer-specific mandi price average in Column 1
are endogenous to a farmer’s decision to sell: if he chooses to sell only when the actual
mandi price is high, then this average is an overestimate of the true average mandi price
42Note, if the baseline equilibrium is FNRE then we expect there to be no relationship between the
mandi price and the quantity sold or price received. However if the FNRE does not exist, then the baseline
equilibrium is partially pooling, in which case a higher mandi price causes the village trader to offer the
farmer a higher price and the farmer responds by selling more. This can explain this positive coefficient.
27
the farmer was facing. This concern is addressed in Column 2 by instead using an av-
erage where the weekly mandi prices are weighted by the volume of potatoes sold in
that week by sample farmers in control villages in that district. This average is exoge-
nous to the farmer’s decision to sell, but may be less relevant to the farmgate price. We
continue to see a large and statistically significant negative intercept effect and positive
slope effect of the private information interventions. The signs are similar for the public
information treatment, although the slope coefficient is not precisely estimated.
Note that in the bargaining model, the information intervention changes the equilib-
rium because it informs the farmer that the mandi price is either higher or lower than the
expected price. So in column 3, instead of using the actual mandi price as the regressor
we use the deviation of the 2008 mandi price from the predicted price, using weekly
mandi prices from other years for which we have data (2007, 2011 and 2012) to gen-
erate the prediction. Under standard rational expectation assumptions, this mandi price
“shock” ought to be orthogonal to farmers’ ex ante price information and other relevant
characteristics.43 Note the intercept effect of the interventions now measures the effect
of the treatment for farmers selling in states where the expected mandi price equalled
the actual price, unlike previous specifications where the intercept effects pertained to
a hypothetical mandi price of zero. The model predicts that if the intervention does not
change the farmer’s belief about the prevailing price, it cannot change the equilibrium.
The interaction term of the treatment with the slope coefficient continues to have the
same interpretation: it estimates the effect of the intervention when the actual price is
above the expected price.
As expected, we see in column 3 that the intercept terms are non-significant. The
effects of the information treatments on the slope coefficient are positive, and the one
43Since the explanatory variable is itself derived from estimates from other regressions, we report
cluster-bootstrap standard errors, where the mandis are defined as the clusters.
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on the private intervention is statistically significant.44 In column 4 we instrument the
mandi price with the interaction of the city price and the distance between the mandi and
the city. This addresses the concern that mandi price changes may be endogenous to the
intervention. If the city price is unaffected by the price in any given mandi, the exclu-
sion restriction is satisfied. As we know from Table 2, there is considerable pass-through
from the city price to the mandi price; hence it is unsurprising that the instruments are
not weak.45 Our results for the private information treatment are quantitatively and qual-
itatively similar when we use the instrumented mandi price instead of the actual.
6 Testing Alternative Models
We now discuss whether the experimental results are consistent with alternative models
of the farmer-trader trading mechanism.
6.1 Risk-Sharing Contracts with Full Commitment
An ex ante contract would specify the quantity that the farmer sells and the price the
middleman pays, for each realization of w (reported by the trader). This would allow
the middleman and farmer to share price risk. In a direct analogy to implicit wage-
employment contracts where firms insure workers against product price shocks that they
observe privately (Hart 1983), a risk-neutral middleman would pay the farmer a constant
44The effect of the price deviation in control villages (see the first row) turns out to be negative and
significant. This is consistent with the model, for the following reason. Since the actual price is positively
correlated with the expected mandi price, a positive price deviation relative to a low expected price may
still imply a lower actual price and therefore a smaller supply response than a negative price deviation
relative to a high expected price. For example, suppose the farmer’s “low” expected mandi price was a
price between 0 and 3, with a mean of 1.5. If the intervention informs him that the true price is 2.8, this
is a positive price deviation. If instead he held a “high” expectation of the mandi price, i.e. he thought the
price was between 3 and 6 with a mean of 4.5, then an intervention that informs him that the true price
is 3.2, is a negative price deviation. However he will supply a larger quantity of potatoes in the negative
price deviation state than in the positive price deviation state.
45They pass the Kleinberg-Paap test for weak instruments with an F-statistic of 24.17.
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price regardless of the wholesale price. Since the middleman bears all the residual risk,
he has no incentive to understate the wholesale price; his private information does not
create any distortions. The middleman margins could then represent risk premia on this
price insurance. While such a contract would generate the observed low transmission
of the wholesale price to the farmgate price, it also implies that the experiment would
have no impact at all. We summarize this prediction in the second row of Table 4. This
contrasts with our result that the information provision increased pass-through.
Asymmetric information generates distortions only if middlemen are also risk-
averse, so that farmers also bear some of the risk associated with wholesale price fluc-
tuations. This causes some of the fluctuations in the wholesale price to pass through to
the farmgate price. In turn, this creates an incentive for the middleman to understate
the wholesale price, so as to persuade the farmer to accept a lower price. To keep the
middleman honest, traded quantities would be distorted downwards when the wholesale
price is low, and would be set at the efficient level when the price is at the maximum
(the standard no-distortion-at-the-top result). Information interventions that reduce the
asymmetry of information would reduce this screening distortion. This would cause the
traded quantity to increase at low wholesale prices, but have no effect at high whole-
sale prices. Thus risk-sharing contracts with asymmetric information would predict a
positive average treatment effect on quantity transacted; the treatment effect would es-
pecially be positive in low-market-price states, and would vanish in high price states.
This prediction is summarized in the third row of Table 4. In contrast, our experimental
results show a significant negative impact on quantity traded in low-price states.
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6.2 Risk-Sharing Contracts with Limited Commitment
Limited-commitment contracting models have been used to explain insurance and mar-
keting contracts in a range of developing countries. These models allow for the possibil-
ity of ex post moral hazard: when the outside spot market price exceeds the risk-sharing
price, the farmer might renege on the contract and sell there instead. As a result, these
contracts allow farmers and traders to share some, but not all of the price risk (Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall 2002, Blouin and Machiavello 2013, Machiavello and Morjaria
2015 and Saenger, Torero, and Qaim 2014). Providing the farmer with information about
market prices increases this hazard, reducing traders’ profits in the states when the guar-
anteed farmgate price is below the spot market price. In turn this limits traders’ ability
to pay the guaranteed price when it is above the spot market price. Thus, informing
farmers about the market price can unravel the insurance arrangement, increasing the
pass-through from the wholesale price to the farmgate price. Accordingly, the farmer
would sell less (resp. more) to the middleman when the market price was lower (resp.
higher) than average.
Note first that the farmers in our study were unable to sell directly to buyers at the
wholesale markets. This makes ex post moral hazard very unlikely. Second, for our
results to be consistent with limited-commitment contracting, it must be the case that
traders lose money in some states of the world. In particular, they would make losses
when the mandi price was very low, below the farmgate price. Indeed, this is a sine qua
non of any insurance arrangement. (We summarize this prediction in the fourth row of
Table 4.) We do not find empirical evidence supporting this. During the 2008 harvest,
the lower bounds of the trader net margin at the four quartiles of the mandi price were
Rs -0.10, 0.53, 1.94 and 3.21 respectively.46 In the lowest quartile of the mandi price,
46We use selling costs incurred by farmers as an upper bound estimate of corresponding selling costs
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we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the true margin is zero. Thus even when
mandi prices were extremely low, there is no evidence that the lower bound of the trader
net margin was less than zero.47
6.3 Standard Oligopoly Models
Standard trade and industrial organization models of price pass-through in vertical sup-
ply chains assume monopolistic competition in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
They involve a simultaneous move game where each middleman (who may be dif-
ferentiated on non-price dimensions) selects his price (see e.g., Atkin and Donaldson
2014, Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010, Weyl and Fabinger 2013 and Villas-Boas 2007). Per-
fect competition and perfect collusion are limiting special cases. Such models would
correspond to a variant of our model where village and market traders make simultane-
ous price offers to the farmer. The farmer responds by selecting one of the offers and
a corresponding quantity to sell, or else remains in autarky. Providing information to
farmers would not change anyone’s payoff function: farmer payoffs depend only on the
price offers of the traders since they cannot sell directly in the market themselves, and
traders know their resale price regardless of the intervention. Hence, unlike the signif-
icant heterogenous treatment effects that we observe, this class of models predicts that
the information interventions should have no effect.48 (See the fourth row of Table 4.)
Finally, models with costly search frictions a` la Salop and Stiglitz (1977) predict that
if information interventions lower farmers’ costs of searching for traders offering the
incurred by traders. It suffices to estimate net margins at the harvest time, since the trader has the option
of selling immediately upon purchase, instead of storing the potatoes for later sale. Hence net margins at
the time of the harvest represent a lower bound to their expected margin.
47Mandi price realizations were lower than average in 2008. Since we do not find evidence for negative
trader net margins even in this year, it is very unlikely that traders make losses in low-price states in most
other years.
48The key difference is that in our model the village and market traders move sequentially rather than
simultaneously, and farmers are uninformed about resale prices.
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highest price, then price dispersion would decrease across farmers and sales locations.
(See the fifth row of Table 4.) However since village middlemen and farmers in our study
areas live within close proximity of each other and meet frequently, we expect that these
search costs are negligible. Therefore we do not expect any effects on the dispersion of
prices across farmers.49 Table 8 verifies this. Using either variance or range of prices
as measures of dispersion, we find no evidence that either intervention caused farmgate
prices to become more similar within the village or, the haat price to become more
similar across haats.
7 Conclusion
Unlike other settings where producers have direct access to markets, large transactions
costs and regulations prevent potato farmers in West Bengal from selling to wholesale
buyers directly (Cohen 2013). We have provided evidence that marketing middlemen
earn large margins on average. Our surveys as well as experimental evidence provide
support for a model of ex post bargaining in which wholesale price fluctuations are not
passed through to farmers. While by itself this might suggest that farmers and traders
enter into insurance contracts, we have shown that the entire set of empirical findings
is inconsistent with insurance arrangements. Hence insurance premia cannot account
for the large middleman margins. Instead, we argue that the margins reflect barriers
to entry into the trading business, and farmers’ limited access to markets. Our results
also show that in the context of such vertical supply chains, improving farmers’ access
to price information is unlikely to have positive outcomes on farmgate prices. Hence
researchers and policy-makers need to focus greater attention on promoting competition
among buyers and enhancing farmer access to wholesale markets.
49However, both kinds of models predict that the gap between farmgate and haat prices would narrow.
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Table 1: Potato Cultivation & Sales by Sample
Farmers, 2008
Mean/(SE)
Area planted (acres) 0.663
(0.017)
Quantity harvested (kg) 6553.3
(177.2)
Fraction sold from field 0.428
(0.009)
Fraction stored at home 0.165
(0.007)
Fraction stored in cold store 0.285
(0.008)
Fraction spoiled 0.0262
(0.001)
Quantity sold (kg) 5962.6
(184.5)
Fraction sold at market haat 0.0786
(0.006)
Fraction sold to village trader 0.908
(0.007)
Gross revenue (Rs) 12887.2
(413.0)
Net revenue (Rs) 11974.72
(364.6)
Gross price received (Rs/kg)
sold to village trader 2.156
(0.016)
sold at market haat 2.896
(0.050)
Net price received (Rs/kg)
sold to village trader 2.03
(0.016)
sold at market haat 2.428
(0.050)
Mandi price (reported by vendor) (Rs/kg) 4.821
(0.160)
Tracked price (reported by farmer) (Rs/kg) 2.763
(0.027)
Statistics are computed from farmer survey data collected
in 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Pass-through of City Prices to Mandi and Farmer Prices
Weekly mandi price Weekly farmgate price
all years 2008 2008 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
City price 0.809*** 0.663*** 0.023
(0.009) (0.048) (0.068)
Mandi price 0.043
(0.048)
Local yield (’000 kg/acre) -0.030
(0.020)
Year 2008 0.401***
(0.067)
Year 2011 1.384***
(0.083)
Year 2012 2.254***
(0.073)
Constant -0.587*** 0.346 1.768*** 1.727***
(0.185) (0.245) (0.342) (0.204)
Mandi dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes No No No
Observations 2,691 790 596 596
R-squared 0.977 0.913 0.530 0.531
The unit of observation is a mandi in a week. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable
is the mean weekly mandi price, in columns 3 and 4 it is the mean weekly price received
by farmers in the catchment area of the mandi. Only price data for weeks 13 and beyond
are included for 2007, 2011 and 2012. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ :
p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Effect of Interventions on Farmers’ Tracking Behavior and Precision
Panel A: Effect on Price Tracking Behavior
Track
wholesale
price
Days since
tracked
Source of
informa-
tion
“other”
(1) (2) (3)
Private information 0.805 0.692*** 3.530**
(0.378) (0.069) (2.085)
Phone recipient 1.818** 0.796*** 11.161***
(0.549) (0.041) (5.987)
Public information 8.596*** 0.736*** 52.173***
(5.696) (0.081) (33.083)
Land 1.578*** 0.988 0.932
(0.209) (0.012) (0.071)
Constant 8.197*** 4.945*** 0.005***
(4.431) (0.501) (0.004)
Observations 11,719 10,267 10,267
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.159 0.302
Panel B: Effect on Error in Tracked Price
Mean N
(1) (2)
Control 0.221 3046
Private information:
Phone non-recipient 0.190 2588
Phone recipient 0.179 688
Public information 0.181 4714
F-test of ratio of sum of squares (p-values)
Control/Private Info without phone 0.000
Control/Private Info with phone 0.000
Control/Public Info 0.000
Private Info/Public Info 0.112
Private Info without phone/Private Info with phone 0.151
In Panel A, dependent variables are farmers’ reports in 2008 of whether they tracked prices in
markets, the number of days since they last tracked prices, and their source of information, for a
given potato variety, in the past fortnight. Columns 1 and 3 present odds-ratios of binary logit re-
gressions and column 2 presents the odds-ratios from a Poisson regression. In column 3, we re-
code the farmer’s reports of their source of information into a binary variable indicating “exper-
imental intervention” or not. Further details are in Section 2.2 in the text. Dummy variables for
potato variety, district and survey month are included in all columns. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are clustered at the village level. In Panel B, the normalized “error” is the difference between
the market price the farmer reports for a market in a given week and the average actual price in
that market in that week. The reported means are the mean sums of squared normalized errors.
∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Average Treatment Effects of Information Interventions on
Farmer Sales and Price Received
Quantity sold (kg) Net price received (Rs/kg)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private information 457.64 -30.71 -0.08 0.02
(552.92) (531.37) (0.13) (0.11)
Phone 639.89 567.28 0.09 0.08
(417.83) (433.75) (0.10) (0.09)
Public information 230.54 -289.75 -0.10 -0.05
(522.08) (512.66) (0.12) (0.11)
Land 2,251.88*** 2,215.65*** -0.10*** -0.08***
(174.77) (178.39) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 2,817.06*** 3,034.08*** 2.17*** 2.33***
(551.66) (452.42) (0.12) (0.09)
Observations 2,318 2,318 2,318 2,318
R-squared 0.353 0.387 0.332 0.400
Mandi fixed effects no yes no yes
Mean DV 3855 2.021
SE DV 213.3 0.0325
In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the quantity of potatoes a farmer sold
of a particular variety and quality in a week in 208. Revenue (net of transport, han-
dling and storage costs) is discounted to account for the implicit interest cost of
delays from the time of sale to the receipt of payment, and is then divided by the
quantity sold to arrive at the net price received, which is the dependent variable
in columns 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 3 we include dummy variables for variety,
quality and district of farmer’s residence. In columns 2 and 4 we include dummies
for the quality as well as the mandi whose catchment area the farmer resides in.
A mandi is defined as a (physical) market-variety combination. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the village level. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p <
0.1.
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Table 8: Effect of Information Interventions on Price Dispersion
———Within the village——— —–Across villages—–
Variance of
gross price
received
Range of
gross price
received
Variance of
net price
received
Range of
net price
received
Variance of
haat price
Range of
haat price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private information -0.134 0.176 -0.113 0.239 0.241 0.070
(0.154) (0.253) (0.152) (0.248) (0.386) (0.262)
Public information -0.049 0.306 -0.001 0.373 1.235 0.351
(0.161) (0.288) -0.16 (0.275) (0.818) (0.318)
Constant 0.648*** 2.543*** 0.675*** 2.645*** 0.914*** 0.854***
(0.138) (0.225) (0.136) (0.217) (0.266) (0.184)
Observations 100 100 100 100 458 458
R-squared 0.068 0.109 0.067 0.114 0.480 0.337
Columns (1)-(4) report regressions of measures of within-village dispersion of the average annual prices that
farmers received for each variety in 2008. Variety dummies are included, and robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. Column (5) & (6) report regressions of measures of across-haat dispersion of haat prices within a week,
for each variety. Variety and week dummies are included, and standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
village level.
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